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IRONY AS A COMPLEX ATTITUDE 
 
 
Abstract – Verbal irony is a complex mode of communication which has attracted the attention of scholars 
from several different fields.  Scientific and literary analyses have contributed to shedding light on specific 
aspects of irony, and have provided cumulating evidence of its protean nature and cognitive complexity. 
Attempts to pin down the nature  of verbal irony in terms of antiphrasis have proven to be reductive. Indeed, 
a growing body of literature has pointed out that what is at stake in irony is not simply saying the opposite of 
what is meant but rather communicating  an attitude. This insight, however, needs to be  refined.  In this 
paper irony is argued to be the emergent interpretation of a cluster of attitudes that may surface in different 
forms and modulate  different interpretations of irony, ranging  from gentle and jocular  to more sarcastic 
and biting.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Verbal irony is a complex mode of communication which has attracted the attention of 
scholars from several different fields. Rhetoric has long unveiled the mechanisms of irony, 
mostly understood as antiphrasis,  a trope used for communicating the contrary of what is 
literally said; literary critics have described examples of ironic texts from world literatures 
(Jankélévic 1964, Muecke 1969, 1970, Booth 1974 among many others) and political 
discourse (Hutcheon 1994); psycholinguists have proven the complexity of irony 
interpretation and computation experimentally (cf. Gibbs and Colston 2012); 
neurolinguists have investigated irony as a crucial source of information about some 
pathologies such as autism and schizophrenia (Mo et al. 2008, Wang et al. 2006, see 
further references in Bromberek-Dyzman 2012). 
Still, we agree with Gibbs and Colston (2012) that irony has several characteristics 
that make it an important topic of linguistic research in its own right as a phenomenon of 
ordinary language whose nature has, admittedly, not yet been fully explained (cf. 
Bromberek-Dyzman 2012  and Garmendia 2018 among others). In fact, the considerable 
number of contributions recently published on irony testifies to its cognitive and pragmatic 
complexity. Many publications have investigated its nature as a mechanism basically 
hinging on the literal/nonliteral meaning and therefore crucial to both the discussion on 
how irony is processed in verbal interactions and to the academic debate on the boundaries 
between the domains of semantics and pragmatics. 
Two-stage theories of the understanding of verbal irony rely on prior recognition of 
literal meaning. They assume that it is only by rejecting the literal meaning that the 
contextually based search for the meaning truly intended can start. The Gricean framework 
(Grice 1989) and the Graded Salience Hypothesis (Giora 1995, 1997, 1999, 2003) are the 
two most oustanding models advocating the primacy of literal and, respectively, salient 
meanings in irony interpretation. A number of experimental studies support this view 
demonstrating that irony comprehension is more time-consuming than literal language 
comprehension (Giora et al. 1998, Giora and Fein 1999,Giora 2003, Dews and Winner 
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1999). 
However, as Wilson and Sperber 2000 have pointed out summarising a long 
debate, “`[t]he notion of literal meaning, which plays such a central role in most theories 
of language use, is unclear in many respects” (Wilson and Sperber 2000, p. 250). 
Therefore, other explanations of the mechanisms of verbal irony production and 
understanding have been sought by Relevance Theory, following different paths and 
moving from the basic assumption that literal meaning has no privileged status in the 
production and comprehension of irony – as well as in metaphor and other figures of 
speech. Wilson and Sperber claim that context-dependent interpretation is a one-stage 
process, and no special mechanism needs be postulated for the understanding of non-literal 
utterances. This hypothesis has been supported by a number of empirical studies proving 
that irony comprehension does not take more time than the comprehension of literal 
meanings (Gibbs 1986, Colston 2002, Colston and O’Brian 2000, Ivanko and Pexman 
2003). 
Bromberek-Dyzman (2012) rightly concludes that these conflicting results 
“legitimize questions about the nature of irony and the essence of ironicity” (p. 86). If 
literal/non-literal is not the dimension in which to look for its essence, then a host of 
questions must be reassessed, starting from the basic ones: What meanings are actually 
communicated by ironic utterances? Which processes are responsible for the 
understanding and sometimes for the misinterpretation of an ironic utterance? What are 
the linguistic cues that point to an ironic reading of an utterance? What is the role of 
context and background knowledge in this process? Each of these questions has actually 
received individual answers which represent significant contributions to a deeper 
understanding of a phenomenon that has too quickly been dismissed as merely consisting 
in “meaning the opposite of what is said”. However, in order to turn them into an 
explanatory theory, we still need to dig deep into the nature of irony, and find principled 
accounts and cognitively plausible procedures for deriving ironic meanings. 
The reason why I personally see irony, in its multifarious aspects, as a phenomenon 
worth pragmatic investigation is that it brings to the fore the complexities and the fine-
grained procedures of meaning production and interpretation in context. This calls for a 
view of language which in my opinion would be best represented by a cognitive pragmatic 
theory based on a dynamic systems view of language as suggested by Gibbs and Colston 
(2012) (cf. also Bertuccelli 2003). My contribution to the understanding of irony will 
concentrate on the role of attitudes as recommended by Bromberek-Dyzman 2012, and 
along the lines suggested by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995), Wilson (2006), Wilson and 
Sperber (2012) and further elaborated on in recent contributions by Yus (cf. Yus 2016). 
More specifically, I will try to substantiate the following hypothesis: 
 
irony is a complex attitude  which  may surface in different forms, exhibit different degrees of 
the speaker’s involvement, convey several simultaneous intentions of the speaker, and provoke 
different emotional responses as a result of the  contextual combination of propositional and 
non-propositional attitudes with variable components of the communicative act. 
 
Many factors may in fact contribute to make an utterance ironical: most of them have 
already been identified, but irony seems hard to pin down as the linear sum of a closed set 
of factors. Its very nature seems to be rather protean, bordering on and sometimes 
overlapping with other categories. The challenge for pragmatic theories is, in my mind, to 
spell out these factors, disentangle their intricacies and explain their interactions. 
This paper is meant to give a contribution in this direction. The paper is structured 
in two major sections. In the first, I will give an overview of the most significant types of 
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examples of irony discussed in the literature; I will briefly mention the most outstanding 
linguistic approaches that have been offered to explain them, highlighting how they each 
offer explanations of individual phenomena that can be gathered under the label of irony; 
and I will claim that their adequacy is only partial because irony emerges in various forms 
and modes out of a complex process where the propositional meaning expressed by the 
utterance is only one component.  
In the second part of the paper I will concentrate on the notion of “attitude” 
providing further examples that testify to its role in irony interpretation; I will argue that, 
in order  to explain the wide range of shades of irony emerging in  contexts, we need to 
include both propositional and non-propositional attitudes among the parameters for irony 
description, but we also need to refine and articulate the notion of attitude itself relating it 
to various dimensions of the communicative act and allowing for dynamic combinations 
of different types of attitudes in text and discourse .  
 
 
2. The phenomenology of irony 
 
As Muecke 1970 noticed, “The word “irony” does not now mean what it meant in earlier 
centuries; it does not mean in one country all it may mean in another, nor in the street what 
it may mean in the study, nor to one scholar what it may mean to another.” (Muecke 1970, 
p. 7). Indeed, over the centuries various theories of irony have been put forward to identify 
what counts as “irony”. Irony can be conveyed in several manners and may take multiple 
forms (cf. Dynel 2016): hyperbole, understatement, simile, metaphor, litote, insinuation 
are only some examples. But irony may not be in the words used, or not entirely. 
Sometimes it lies only in the non-verbal behaviour which accompanies ironic expressions, 
and very often non verbal behaviour is the key to irony detection and comprehension. In 
the written text, punctuation may convey ironic meanings: the use of the full stop in (b) 
triggers an ironic interpretation which is absent from (a). 
 
a. Raymond promised to write the article when he had the time;  
b. Raymond promised to write the article. When he had the time. 
 
When it is not triggered by verbal means, irony may be triggered by other devices, both 
orally and in the written text. When words are present, however, words matter. In what 
follows I will provide a brief overview of the verbal instruments by which irony is 
communicated. 
 
2.1. Antiphrasis 
 
A widespread account of verbal irony, based on etymology and on a long standing 
rhetorical tradition, assumes that irony is the same as antiphrasis, i.e. that being ironic is 
stating the opposite of what we intend to communicate: Quintilian defined irony as the 
trope by which «contrarium quod dicitur intelligendum est» (Institutio oratoria VIII, 6.54) 
and a host of rhetoricians followed his teaching. 
Here are some cases that clearly hinge on the mechanism of saying the opposite of 
what is meant: 
 
1. On the way to work, the car gets a flat tire and the driver says “That’s great!” 
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2. In the street, some workers are jackhammering while you are trying to get some 
rest. After a few hours, you finally decide to go out and talk with them. On seeing 
you, one of them asks – “Does the noise bother you?” –  You reply  –  “Oh, no, I 
have just come to tell you not to stop it: it's so relaxing!” 
 
In both cases, however,  the point of the irony is neither barely communicating what is 
said – which would be insincere or deceitful,  nor conveying the opposite propositional 
meaning –  which would at least be uninformative. The point of the irony lies somewhere 
else. 
In general terms, it is only too clear that if we say one thing and mean another 
thing, there must be some reasons. Otherwise, why not say it directly? (cf. Dews, Kaplan 
and Winner 2009) The problem can be tackled in terms of cognitive economy, rationality 
and informativity, but of course there may also be social reasons for being ironic (cf. 
Barbe 1995): why should we engage our interlocutor in a task which is cognitively more 
demanding than its literal counterpart? What are the cognitive gains of this extra effort? 
Obviously, part of a plausible answer is that we want to communicate something more 
than its literal counterpart. The questions then become: What is this “more”?  Where does 
it lie? How do we perceive it? Other questions, however,  concern  the  assumption itself 
that  for each ironic utterance there is one unambiguously identifiable literal counterpart of 
what is said. 
In examples like the following, the “opposite meaning” is not equivalent to the 
negation of the main predicate alone 
 
3. I love people with good manners. (Haverkate 1990, p.92) 
 
Here, what the speaker may be assumed to be actually communicating is not  
 
 3a.  I don’t love/I hate people with good manners. 
 
What is communicated is  rather 
 
 3b. I love people with good manners, but you do not belong to that kind of people  
 
or 
 
 3c. I don’t love people with bad manners. 
 
However, if the speaker  had actually uttered 3b or 3c, she would not have been ironic: she 
would have simply been reproaching John. Nor are 3b or 3c the only things communicated 
by the ironic reading of 3.  In order for the ironic interpretation to emerge we need to 
trigger a complex inferential process that  starts with  including something like the 
adversative in  3b  and ends with communicating two truths: that of the appropriate 
negative counterpart and that of the positive statement, plus “something”, a “supplement 
of meaning” (Hutcheon 1995, p. 2)  which is where irony really lies. Consider one more 
example: 
 
4. A student who goes to the restroom every day during class asks the teacher if he can go. 
Her response is “Sure, it is not like we do anything important in this class.” 
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One ironic interpretation of this example is that the teacher is possibly “saying” what she 
thinks the student may be thinking; consequently, if a notion of “saying the opposite of 
what is meant” can be applied, then it should be connected it with the student’s thought. 
Again, something more than the reverse of what is said is at work in the interpretation of 
the utterance: “sure” is ironic because it pretends to agree with the thought ascribed to the 
student, which in turn is ironic because it is the opposite of what is actually going on in the 
class. A rough wording of what is communicated would presumably be: “We are doing 
something important in this class, therefore you should stay here and try to learn; but you 
seem to be thinking that what we are doing is not important, therefore you are asking to go 
to the restroom. I want you to realize that what you  think is wrong; therefore, I pretend to 
agree with your thought, thereby attracting your attention to what we are doing in the 
class; by doing that, I hope that you may notice the incongruity between your request and 
the situation, and consequently understand that I regret it (or I am angry at it); I want you 
to realize that, and to notice further that I am not overtly reproaching you, even though I 
could/should”.  
The complexity of the inference highlights that the kind of reasoning involved in 
grasping  irony concerns not only propositions, but also intentions, illocutions, feelings, 
subjective evaluations, and attributed thoughts.  
 
2.2. Speaking literally 
 
As I said above, antiphrastic irony does not cancel the truth of what is literally said: in 
being ironic one also literally means what he said. A mother who looks at the messy room 
of her son and exclaims 
 
5. “I do like it when you keep your room tidy!” 
 
does not mean only the opposite of what she says: we perceive her comment as ironic 
because of the contrast between the tidiness mentioned and the messiness of the room, but 
we perceive also that something more is being communicated. Still, enriching the 
proposition to something like “I do like it when you keep your room tidy but I do not like 
it when you keep it in a mess like this” (or similar) would not convey the  whole meaning 
communicated. What is further communicated is some attitude that goes beyond the words 
actually used and beyond their negative counterpart (or integration). 
Similarly, if a husband is totally absorbed by a TV programme, his wife may 
exclaim something like 
 
6. “I really appreciate when you give me all your attention!” 
 
which is literally true, but because of the clash with the situation in which the statement is 
produced, we perceive that there is an attitude in what is communicated that somehow 
gives to the words uttered a meaning that “goes beyond” what is conventionally attached 
to them. And “going beyond” does not necessarily entail “saying the opposite”. Someone 
who is melting away under a scorching sun in Tuscany may say 
 
7. “Well, here we are, under the Tuscan sun…” 
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citing the title of a famous book and film which was meant to praise the beauty of the 
Tuscan landscape and climate. In this case, the ironic interpretation does not require 
identification of the opposite meaning of the proposition uttered (“We are not under the 
Tuscan sun”); rather, it consists in  evoking (or “echoing” as Relevance theorists claim) 
the title of the book while at the same time negating part of the encyclopaedic information 
attached to it (We are indeed under the Tuscan sun, but it is not “that” beautiful).  
 Several other problems point to the inadequacy of a generic “saying the opposite of 
what you mean” account.  Many forms of verbal irony are not declaratives, therefore it 
would be difficult to compute the opposite: think of a rhetorical question like: “How could 
I possibly be angry?” uttered by a speaker who is simply furious, or think of an ironical 
imperative like “Come on, let’s have a nice walk!” uttered by someone who needs to go 
home under a heavy rain without an umbrella. 
 
2.2.1. Modulating literal meanings 
 
Grice claimed that irony is an implicature, one of the results of violations of the maxim of 
Quality (Grice 1989). The problems here, as many critics have pointed out, include the 
fact that other figures of speech, such as similes, hyperbole, metaphor and irony, also 
appear to violate the same maxim, although in different ways and with different effects. 
As Grice himself acknowledged, this account is not sufficient by itself to explain the 
differences between the various figures of speech. 
 Indeed, these same figures can be used to convey ironic meanings. Irony may be 
conveyed by similes that exploit the mechanism of oxymoron: 
 
8. As clear as mud/ soft like concrete/ pleasant as a root canal 
 
They say something which is blatantly false, thus triggering a reasoning like: “mud is not 
clear, therefore if something is said to be as clear as mud, then it is not clear at all”. The 
point, again, is whether what is communicated by the simile is simply that something is 
not clear at all or is obscure. The answer is clearly that something more is put across – a 
wish to amuse, to be witty, to be sympathetic, to surprise the interlocutor, among others. 
 Hyperboles may be used ironically to express similar feelings and attitudes 
 
9. A: “I do deserve an award for what I have done for them” B: “Yes, they will appoint 
you Prime Minister” 
 
10. (To his son who has just reported his bad grades in mathematics): “So, my little 
Einstein, how do you feel about it?” 
 
Moreover, irony can be the outcome of violations of other maxims 
 
11. “Miss X produced a series of sounds that corresponded closely with the score 'Home 
Sweet Home'” (Grice 1989, p. 37) 
 
(11) is perceived as ironic but, as claimed by Grice himself, it is a violation of the maxim 
of manner, and 
12. “It seems to be raining” 
said when two people are caught in a downpour may be read as ironic even if we would 
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not like to say that the speaker is being untruthful. Rather, he is saying less than would be 
appropriate in the context (see Dynel 2013 for a reassessment of irony from a neo-Gricean 
perspective). Neither 11 nor 12 have to do with “saying the opposite of what is meant” in a 
propositional sense. Both, however, communicate something more than just what they say 
(some kind of subjective evaluation of the situation) with the intention of achieving some 
specific effect (for example, to amuse, criticise or complain), and with the intention of 
achieving it via the addressee’s recognition of that intention and of the attitude(s) behind 
it.  
 
2.3. Phrasal irony 
 
While most studies consider irony a phenomenon that concerns utterances and 
propositions, Louw (1993) and Partington (2011) point out that ironic effects may be 
achieved also at the phrasal level by upsetting the standard collocational patterns of lexical 
items. 
Statistically relevant collocations create expectations that may be consciously 
reversed by replacements triggering an ironic reading. The replacements fall into two 
major types: 
 
a. an expected negative element of the template is replaced by something positive; 
b. an expected positive element of the template is replaced by something negative. 
 
An example of the former is the use of “an/the outbreak of NP”, which generally primes 
expectations of something unfavourable (wars, hostilities, fightings, despair, violence are 
the most common associations), with a positively charged NP, like democracy, candour, 
love, peace, solidarity (cit. in Partington 2011, p. 1791): 
 
13. Those suspicious of the recent outbreak of love between Blair and Brown 
14. Senior American ofﬁcials have been playing down the hope that the vote will lead to 
an outbreak of peace 
15. So, what hope is there for an outbreak of honesty among Italian journalists? 
 
An example of the latter is the use of “make (occasionally, do) a good job of NP” where 
the expected NP, generally denoting something positive, desirable or favourable, is 
replaced by a negative concept (cit. Partington 2011, p.1794): 
 
16. It may seem a waste of good ink to take apart Robin Cook’s arguments when he has 
made such a good job of discrediting himself. (Times, 8 April 2003). 
 
No reverse mechanism can be invoked here except one that concerns expectations (cf. 
Averbeck 2010).   
Similarly, Haverkate (1990) pointed out that in sentences like  “Your friend asked me to 
lend him the nice little sum of $100.000”(Haverkate 1990, p. 82), an overt “contradictio in 
terminis” is created between the amount of money and  its qualification as “nice little 
sum”. It is this linguistic contradiction that triggers the ironic reading of the utterance but  
the point of the irony is not asserting its opposite (“a big sum”). The point of the irony is 
communicating an attitude via that contradiction . 
 
2.4. Pretending and echoing 
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A view which has permeated the psycholinguistic literature on irony is the so-called 
“pretense theory”. Attitudes play a crucial role within this theoretical framework. 
The theory is based on the idea that, when speaking ironically, speakers perform a 
pretended act, simulate, or put “on stage” ideas, thoughts and feelings which are not their 
true, personal ideas, thoughts and feelings. They do this for the sake of mocking each 
other and themselves while creating at the same time a feeling of delight and intimacy 
(Clark 1996, Clark and Gerrig 1984). A Modest Proposal by Jonathan Swift is claimed to 
be a long example of the pretense that underlies ironic statements. 
A nice example is provided by Gibbs and Colston (2002) of a conversation 
occurring between two students in an apartment about some visitors who have been 
invited by another roommate. 
 
17. Anne: By the way, were our wonderful guests still here when you came out and ate 
lunch? 
Dana: I had a sandwich and… 
Anne: Isn’t it so nice to have guests here? 
Dana: Totally! 
Anne: I just love it, you know, our housemates. They bring in the most wonderful guests 
in the world and they can totally relate to us 
Dana: Yes, they do 
Anne (Laughs) Like I would just love to have them here more often (Laughs) I so I can 
cook for them, I can prepare (Laughs) 
Dana: To make them feel welcome 
Anne: Yeah. Isn’t it great, Dana? Like today I was feeling all depressed and I came out 
and I saw the guests and they totally lightened up their mood. I was like the happiest 
person on earth 
Dana: unhuh 
Anne: I just welcome them so much, you know, ask them if they want anything to drink or 
eat (Laughs). (Gibbs and Colston 2002, p. 184) 
 
Anne and Dana use different tools to convey their displeasure about the guests staying in 
their apartments, and about the housemate who invited them: sarcasm, jocularity, 
rhetorical questions, hyperbole are addressed to the same targets on the basis of mutually 
shared feelings and beliefs. It is this common ground of beliefs and feelings that allows 
Anne and Dana to pretend to enjoy their roommate’s visitors when this is obviously 
untrue. Awareness of this shared common ground creates that interpersonal bond of 
intimacy that enables them to enjoy the subtle play of staged pretense they are engaged in. 
The pretense model underlines the fact that the aim of this staged communicative 
act is to attract attention not so much to the act itself but to the speaker’s attitude towards 
the act. Underlying this hypothesis is the idea that irony is a mode of thought and speech 
involving layers of meaning that require metarepresentational reasoning to be produced 
and understood. The hypothesis is shared by Relevance theorists who have further 
elaborated a model that accounts for the kind of metarepresentational reasonings involved 
in irony comprehension in terms of echoes and attitudes. 
 
2.5. Echoes and attitudes 
 
The “echo theory” put forward by Wilson and Sperber (1992), Wilson (2006), Wilson and 
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Sperber (2012) represents an important turn in the study of irony. The Relevance theoretic 
account argues that irony achieves its effects by echoing a previous statement, or a belief 
associated with stereotypical situations or norms. 
 
18. Mary (after a boring party): That was fun. 
19. I left my bag in the restaurant, and someone kindly walked off with it. 
20. Sue (to someone who has done her a disservice): I can’t thank you enough (Wilson and 
Sperber 2012, p. 123). 
 
In each case, the point of the irony is to indicate that a proposition the speaker might 
otherwise be taken to endorse is ludicrously inadequate (as a whole, or in part – in 
example 19, it is the word “kindly” that triggers the irony). 
Echoing is different from pretense, though. Its nature is made explicit through the 
theoretical distinction between descriptive and attributive use of language: the former 
concerns the expression of a thought or a state of affairs, the latter concerns a second order 
type of content, related to some source other than the speaker’s. Echoing is a subtype of 
attributive use of language, in which the speaker’s primary goal is not to convey 
information about a thought or state of affairs but rather to convey her/his own reaction or 
attitude to that thought or state of affairs. In Relevance Theory, two factors are therefore 
necessary in irony comprehension: a) recognition of the utterance as echoing some other 
utterance, thought, norm or opinion; b) recognition that the speaker’s attitude to the 
echoed component belongs to the range of dissociative attitudes: the speaker rejects a 
tacitly attributed thought as ludicrously false (or blatantly inadequate in other ways) 
(Wilson and Sperber 2012, p. 136). What is communicated by irony is therefore neither 
the proposition literally expressed nor its opposite, but an attitude towards the proposition 
and towards those who might have held it. 
A distinctive prediction of the echoic theory of irony is that it cannot work unless 
the audience can attribute to specific people, or to people in general, a thought that the 
ironical utterance can be taken to echo (Wilson and Sperber 2012, p. 141). The following 
example highlights the echo presupposed and the communicated attitude and implicatures: 
 
21. Peter: It’s a lovely day for a picnic 
(They go for a picnic and it rains) 
Mary: It’s a lovely day for a picnic, indeed. (Sperber and Wilson 1995, pp. 239-40) 
 
Mary obviously wants to communicate her belief that it is not a lovely day for a picnic, as 
in: 
 
a. Mary manifestly believes that it is not a lovely day for a picnic, 
 
but she also ironically conveys a set of other weak implicatures like: 
 
b. It was wrong of Peter to say that it was a lovely day for a picnic 
c. Peter’s judgement has been unsound 
d. It was Peter’s fault that their day has been ruined 
e. Mary should have never trusted Peter in his weather predictions 
 
which in turn express some other kinds of attitudes. 
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The point I would like to emphasize in this regard is that these weak implicatures 
are different in quality from (a): the difference with the propositional attitude inference in 
(a) is that they express feelings (of disappointment, bitterness, regret, and similar) which 
may refer to different components of the situation (Peter, the day, the rain, the speaker 
herself, the fact that Peter said so, etc.); they may be derived from the propositional 
attitude manifestly communicated (“Mary BELIEVES that (b, c, d, e)”) and combine with 
it to trigger the  further indirect readings of the statement as blaming, complaining, or 
accusing. These latter are indeed some of the illocutionary forces expressed by the weak 
inferences. Haverkate remarked that “Bringing about this type of illocutionary 
transformation is one of the principal aims of the ironic speaker who avails himself  of the 
strategy of “meaning something different from what he says”(Haverkate 1990,  p. 89). 
Even though irony is not itself an illocutionary act (performative utterances such as “I 
hereby ironically inform you/ask/request  that..” are not pragmatically acceptable (cf. 
Haverkate 1990, p.79)), the ironic interpretation of an utterance plays on attitudes as  
components of the illocutionary force.  
 
 
 
2.6. Attitudes and illocutions 
 
Let’s consider the following example: 
 
22. “Well, you are a big help round here”. 
 
What is communicated by a wife uttering this sentence when her husband is comfortably 
sitting on the sofa, watching television and drinking a beer while she rushes here and there 
trying to tidy up a messy room, with children crying and lots of things to do, is probably 
not simply the opposite “Well, you are NOT a big help round here”, even though it is 
crystal clear that this is the case and it is part of what is communicated. 
She may be communicating her feelings of anger, disappointment, frustration or 
bitterness that he is not helping, but this is also what she would have communicated had 
she used the direct utterance “Well, you are NOT a big help round here”. So why use the 
ironical reverse? Presumably because she also wants to communicate some more affects, 
including that she wants to be kind, not to disparage, not to argue in front of the children, 
or something similar, which cannot be conveyed by simply communicating the opposite of 
what is said. If this is the case, then a way to handle the representation of what she has 
communicated is to enrich the propositional form with a complex set of attitudes from 
which the appropriate subset will be  inferred from the context. 
In other words, the contrast p/–p is only part of the ironic game.  
Indeed, if we say p (You are a big help) and communicate –p (You are not a big 
help), and if p may be explicated like att(p), where att is the set of (positive) mental states 
and feelings which cluster to conventionally produce the illocutionary force “praise”, then 
by communicating –p we detach the positive attitude from the content, and we transitively 
turn the illocution into its negative counterpart (“blame”). 
However,  it would be reductive to translate this claim directly in terms of indirect 
illocutions. What I am claiming is not that irony is an indirect speech act or that by irony 
we simply and always turn one illocution into its negative counterpart (say, a compliment 
into a blame or into a complaint). Irony is not an illocution, nor is “being ironic” a 
performative. What I am instead trying to suggest is that irony is a complex attitude that 
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shares some of its components with illocutions, but its interpretation demands a complex 
inferential mechanism which operates selectively on the set of attitudes available in the 
context. Irony can just dissociate an attitude conventionally attached to an expression 
turning it into its propositional opposite, it can negate a subset of those mental states and 
feelings that are associated with p keeping some of the positive affective components, or it 
can decompose/defragment the set of attitudes that enter the composition of a 
conventionally associated illocution and combine them differently to let another kind of 
illocution emerge.  
The inferential steps in the interpretation process of our utterance may therefore be 
something like: 
 
a. She said p and, under normal circumstances, p would be a praise, and the illocutionary 
force of PRAISING includes a set of attitudes and emotions like gratitude, pleasure, 
satisfaction etc.  
b. Unfortunately, the circumstances are such that p does not hold; rather, –p is the case:  
“ You are not a big help”. This much is part of the shared context. Therefore, the husband 
can infer the illocutionary intention “she does not mean to praise me; quite to the contrary, 
she is blaming me, criticising me or complaining about me”. However, the reasoning goes: 
c. uttering –p directly would amount to expressing an overt complaint, a blame or a 
criticism, and that would have been associated with feelings of displeasure, sorrow, and 
regret, which would certainly have hurt the husband more; 
d. therefore she did not say –p; she said p because she wants her husband to realize that the 
situation is such that p does not hold (she wants to attract his attention to a clash between 
her words and the situation, perhaps echoing an utterance that she may have uttered on 
other occasions where he was actually a big help) but at the same time she does not want 
to express all the negative feelings and attitudes associated with the illocutionary force of  
–p. Irony is the mode of communication that enables the simultaneous conveyance of 
some feelings associated with the positive statement and the inference of some negative 
ones associated with the reversed illocution. 
 
In different, more Relevance theoretically oriented terms, she is offering ostensive 
behaviour that what she says is not the case, that she is unable to praise her husband, and 
leaves to him to infer that he is to blame, that she regrets it, and possibly more (what 
exactly cannot be stated in absolute terms, since it depends on which factors (feelings, 
emotions, information) the speaker has in mind and which factors the addressee has in 
mind (the emotional and cognitive context shared)). The clash perceived in the context 
between what is said (be it positive or negative) and its informative value, or the 
informative value of its putative reverse, is only part of the process of irony 
comprehension. The latter further presupposes a complex attitude out of which either a 
different illocutionary force or different feelings and attitudes may emerge. 
In this connection, ironic thanking is a case in point. If you do something nice for 
someone, like holding the door, and they do not acknowledge it, you can say “You are 
welcome” with an ironic attitude. There is no explicit utterance to which you are replying, 
but an expectation has been frustrated. You reply to an empty space in the script for the 
polite performance of an act of “thanking” and, by drawing attention to it, let your 
interlocutor realize that he has been unkind. Thereby, the act of polite thanking turns into 
an act of complaint or criticism without all the implicated negative meanings 
conventionally attached to it. 
Another interesting example is provided by Gibbs and Colston (2012, p. 253). 
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An advertisement sponsored by the California Department of Health Services was played 
in May 1998 on California radio stations. The radio spot is spoken in the voice of a 60- 
year-old man in a very sincere tone of voice: 
 
23. “We the Tobacco Industry would like to take this opportunity to thank you, the young people of 
America, who continue to smoke our cigarettes despite Surgeon General warnings that smoking causes lung 
cancer, emphysema, and heart disease. Your ignorance is astounding and should be applauded. Our tobacco 
products kill 420,000 of you parents and grandparents every year. And yet, you’ve stuck by us. That kind of 
blind allegiance is hard to find. In fact, 3,000 of you start smoking everyday because we tobacco folks tell 
you it’s cool. (starts to get carried away). 
Remember, you’re rebels!Individuals! And besides, you impressionable little kids are makin’ us tobacco 
guys rich!! Heck, we’re billionaires!! (clears throat/ composes himself). 
In conclusion, we the tobacco conglomerates of America owe a debt of gratitude to all teens for their 
continued support of our products despite the unfortunate disease and death that they cause. Thank you for 
your understanding. Thank you for smoking. Yours truly. The Tobacco Industry”. 
 
As Gibbs and Colston remark, irony is used here as a powerful rhetorical instrument to 
attract the listeners’ attention and to make teenagers aware of the persuasive techniques 
employed by the Tobacco Industry to seduce youth to start smoking cigarettes. 
The communicative intention is one of deep criticism, disguised by humour, of the 
underhanded methods of the Tobacco Industry. The whole ad is based on the assumption 
that there is something positive for which the Tobacco Industry is grateful – the essential 
condition for the speech act of thanking is that it counts as an expression of appreciation 
for something that the speaker believes the addressee has done to benefit him. From the 
point of view of the Tobacco Industry, this is actually the case: young people who keep 
buying cigarettes do deserve their gratitude because they make them richer and richer. 
From this point of view, the statements, attitudes and feelings of the beneficiary Tobacco 
Industry are truthful: they are really happy and grateful for the continued support of their 
products by young people.  
However, this is only one of the two possible points of view from which the speech 
act of thanking is felicitous. The second is in fact the point of view of the young people: 
they are thanked for buying cigarettes that the industry sells them, but selling cigarettes is 
an action that is detrimental to them, something for which the industry should actually 
apologize. Coulmas (1981) investigated the typological similarity of apologies and 
expressions of gratitude concluding that the common link between the two was 
indebtedness. According to Coulmas, expressions of thanks convey a speaker’s 
indebtedness as a recipient of a benefit, whereas apologies express the speaker’s 
indebtedness to his or her interlocutor for having performed an action that is detrimental to 
the hearer. The point of contrast that triggers the ironic reading of the ad is that they 
should not be happy and grateful at all because, by persuading them to buy their products, 
they kill young people. Therefore they are the most to be blamed.  
 If a reverse is to be sought for the irony in this ad, it is to be found not in what is 
said but in the presupposition (Searle’s essential condition of a speech act of thanking) that 
what they are doing is beneficial for the addressees – that is to say, in the belief that young 
people actually deserve gratitude. The whole argument is therefore pragmatically 
fallacious: it features conclusions that drive us away from what we would expect given the 
contents of the premises. 
 
2.7. Irony vs sarcasm 
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Resuming my argument, I would like to conclude this section  with a final remark on irony 
and sarcasm.  
Even though irony and sarcasm are often confused and considered to be very 
similar, irony is not sarcasm. They are said to share a “critical attitude”, and the property 
of being a vehicle of wit, but there are differences. For one thing, a sarcastic comment or 
remark does not necessarily mean the opposite of what is being said: sarcasm generally 
means exactly what it says, but the truth of it makes the utterance sound sharp, bitter, 
cutting, or caustic, thus turning it into an instrument for expressing indignation (Bowes 
and Katz 2011). Ridicule of a specific victim – a person or an idea – sometimes plays a 
larger role in sarcasm than in irony (Lee & Natz 2009). In contrast, the ridicule conveyed 
by irony seems to be more gentle; emotional responses to irony and sarcasm also differ 
(Leggit and Gibbs 2000). In other words, it seems that the attitudes at stake in ironic and 
sarcastic statements may make the difference. 
Wilson and Sperber (2012) see a continuum from sarcasm to other forms of milder 
irony, whereas Gibbs and Colston (2012) see a category abstraction (cf. also Fein,Yeari, 
Giora 2015 “sarcastic irony”): 
 
…the category of irony is not itself a unique figure, but serves as an umbrella term for 
sarcasm, jocularity, hyperbole, understatement, and rhetorical questions. The significant 
overlap between these sub-types of irony is really then not surprising. (Gibbs and Colston 
2012, p. 221) 
 
 
Whichever solution we prefer to the problem of the multifacetedness of irony, it 
seems hard to deny that phenomena such as the ones we have analysed above point 
to the need to investigate more deeply the nature, the role and the dynamics of 
attitudes in ironic communication. As we have seen above, the ironic reading may be 
triggered by several language means. Spelling out the explicit markers of irony is not 
enough, however, to understand the deep mechanisms of irony production and 
understanding. The real challenge is, in my view, to discover the conceptual 
components which (combine to) surface as linguistic cues that attract an ironic 
reading, or make it shift towards sarcasm or, again, combine to produce satire. 
 
 
3. Attitudes 
 
As the number of examples discussed above prove, the notion of attitude is crucial in 
defining the nature of irony. “Critical attitude” is the notion most frequently invoked in the 
literature (Colston 1997, Garmendia 2010, 2011, 2018). The role of attitudes in ironic 
communication had actually been noticed by Grice himself: in Lecture 3 of his William 
James Lectures, when discussing a possible counterexample of his brief description of 
irony in Lecture 2, he came to the conclusion that (in the specific case) irony involves the 
expression of “a hostile or derogatory judgement or a feeling such as indignation or 
contempt” (p. 53), even though he made no attempt to integrate these remarks into his 
framework.   
The Relevance theoretic explanation of irony crucially hinges upon the notion of 
“dissociative attitude”: 
 
The central claim of the echoic account is that what distinguishes verbal irony from other 
varieties of echoic use is that the attitudes conveyed are drawn from the dissociative range: the 
speaker rejects a tacitly attributed thought as ludicrously false (or blatantly inadequate in other 
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ways). Dissociative attitudes themselves vary quite widely, falling anywhere on a spectrum 
from amused tolerance through various shades of resignation or disappointment to contempt, 
disgust, outrage or scorn. The attitudes prototypical of verbal irony are generally seen as 
coming from the milder, or more controlled, part of the range. However, there is no cut off 
point between dissociative attitudes that are prototypically ironical and those that are not. 
(Wilson and Sperber 2012, p. 13-14) 
 
Attardo (2000) has remarked that the inferred attitudes and feelings that characterize ironic 
statements need not always belong to a negative area. Cases like the following (24 and 25 
from Attardo 2000) are examples of jocular irony that involves positive reversals of the 
negative implications: 
 
24. Sorry to keep bothering you like this. (Spoken by your stock broker on calling for the 
third time to announce unexpected dividends.)  
25. These American-made cars that break down after 100,000 miles! 
26. Looking at a child who is enjoying an icecream: ”Disgusting, isn’t it?” 
 
But it is uncontroversial that irony is more often associated with attitudes of varying 
degrees of negativity rather than positivity. 
 
3.1. The nature of attitudes 
 
It is worth pointing out that, despite the by now large agreement on their role in 
communication, a unanimously shared definition of “attitudes” is still lacking. Which is a 
sign, in my opinion, of the complexity of the notion. Fishbein (1966)  actually reported 
more than a hundred definitions. However, throughout the history of research on attitudes, 
four definitions are more commonly accepted. One definition views attitudes as feelings or 
evaluative reactions to objects (how positive or negative, favourable or unfavourable 
someone feels towards an object). A second type of definitions views attitudes as learned 
dispositions to respond to an object or class of objects in consistently favourable or 
unfavourable ways. A third class of definitions, popularised by cognitively oriented social 
psychologists, sees attitudes as enduring organizations of motivational, emotional, 
perceptual and cognitive processes. According to this view, attitudes consist of three 
components: a. the cognitive, or knowledge component, b. the affective or emotional 
component, and c. the behavioural tendency component. Finally, a fourth dimension of 
research treats attitudes as being multidimensional in nature, involving the strength of each 
of a number of beliefs a person holds towards various aspects of an object and the 
evaluation he gives to each belief as it relates to the object. 
The four types of definitions reflect gradual shifts of theoretical interest in the 
study of attitudes. While definitions based on the intrinsic properties of attitudes aimed at 
finding a place for them among the concepts used by social psychology, it has gradually 
become evident that attitudes share some features with related notions from which they 
should distinguished, such as intentions, expectations, opinions, values and personality 
features (for a cognitive approach to opinions and attitudes as forms of social cognition, 
see van Dijk 1991, 1995). Cognitive psychologists have further stressed the function of 
attitudes as ways of entertaining some forms of representation which are “prewired into 
the very architecture of the mind”(Sperber and Wilson 1986, p. 74).  
In the lack of a widely shared definition, Bertuccelli Papi (2000) has proposed a 
“rich” notion of attitude along the following lines: 
 
a. Attitudes are mental states and have objects (or referents); they may also be themselves 
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objects of other representations, thus setting a second-order dimension of attitudinal 
meaning; 
b. Attitudes express subjective evaluations of various components of the communicative 
situation, ranging from single verbal items to propositions to the context and the 
addressee; 
c. Attitudes also express relational dispositions: they position people with regard to one 
another by signalling the status of the information communicated in both cognitive and 
affective terms; 
d. Attitudes are gradable entities. Attitudinal scales range from an extreme, to which some 
positive value is attached, to an opposite to which a negative value is attached. Thus 
favourable vs unfavourable, likely vs unlikely, certainty vs uncertainty, desire vs 
reluctance, are the extreme values of scales within which multiple internal points can be 
identified. The points or steps along the scales are not simple notions themselves. 
e. Attitudes are internally structured entities (they may be more or less complex); they are 
organized systems of dimensions intersecting with one another and having more than one 
vector so that each scale actually looks like the flattened projection of a multidimensional 
space; 
f. Attitudes surface in various ways in verbal communication: language, facial 
expressions, behaviour, tone of voice, gestures; 
g. From a cognitive point of view, (individually or in combination) they set up frames that 
apply to any kind of information, and control comprehension by activating specific 
knowledge domains, establishing local coherence, and triggering inferential processes that 
may lead to different interpretations of one and the same proposition (cf. van Dijk 1995). 
 
These features do not exhaust the complexity of attitudes, but they represent in my mind a 
synthesis of the major points to be taken into account when trying to spell out their role in  
accounting for the linguistic phenomenology and discourse dynamics of irony.  
A major distinction has been made  between “propositional attitudes” (related to our 
knowledge, beliefs, wishes, intentions, and obligations), and non-propositional attitudes  
(feelings and emotions). Bromberek-Dyzman (2012) calls the latter “affective attitudes 
and claims that   
 
This affective, modal, non-propositional communicative content that evidences how we feel 
about what we say constitutes the backbone of human interpersonal interaction (e.g. Tomasello 
et al. 2005, Tomasello 2008). (Bromberek-Dyzman 2012, p. 88) 
 
4. Irony and attitudes 
 
Yus (2016) has recently focused on attitudes as a central component in the understanding 
of irony, arguing that it is not only propositional attitudes that are at stake in irony 
comprehension, but also affective attitudes: 
 
…for an appropriate account of irony, it is not enough to analyze it in terms of dissociative 
propositional attitudes and identification of the echo, but the identification of the speaker’s 
feelings and emotions (under the broad label of affective attitude) towards the source of the 
echo is also essential. Indeed, ironical interpretations differ radically depending on what 
affective attitude is held by the speaker when uttering the irony, and that affective attitude may 
not only influence the eventual choice of an interpretation, but also the very ascription of irony 
as utterly offensive, mildly offensive, praising or humorous. (Yus 2016, p. 94) 
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Prosody, among other non verbal behaviours such as facial expressions or gestures, may 
guide the addressee not only towards the intended meaning of an ironic utterance but also 
to the speaker’s affective attitude(s). Consider the examples below (from Yus 2016, 
p.105): 
 
27. (One day while parking at work your car splashes mud on Mary. You look at Mary and 
ask her why her clothes are such a mess. She replies….) 
a. Have you noticed that you’ve just splashed mud on me with your car? 
(not much information about the extent of her attitude and emotions) 
b. (laughing) I’m getting ready for a “wet T-shirt” competition. 
(Irony, dissociative attitude, amusement) 
c. (with an angry look and intonation) Thanks a lot for giving me a bath!!! 
(irony, dissociative attitude, anger) 
d. (with a very angry look and a very marked intonation) I loooove your driving ability!!! 
Can you do it again, pleaaaase? 
(irony, dissociative attitude, much more anger) 
 
On most occasions, Yus argues, “affective attitudes are part of the speaker’s intended 
interpretation and play a role in obtaining eventual relevance and an accurate interpretation 
from the ironical utterance. They are part of what the speaker expects the interlocutor to 
recover in order to grasp an appropriate interpretive outcome.” (Yus 2016, p.107) (cf. 
Caffi and Janney 1994, Cacioppo et al. 2004). 
In my opinion, however, the role of attitudes is not to be confined to the 
identification of shades of irony as Yus suggests. I would like to put forward the more 
radical view that irony itself is  a complex  attitude. More precisely, it is my persuasion 
that irony is the outcome of a cluster of attitudes – propositional and non-propositional  – 
which combine differently on different occasions to produce effects that may range from 
reversals of lexical and propositional meanings to illocutionary force modifications, 
cumulating up to the macrolevels of text and discourse to generate more sophisticated and 
elusive interpretations. 
In order to give further empirical substance to my  claim, I will briefly analyze two 
texts, a “serious” one, which appeared in BBC News on July 15, 2015 (“Pluto: What have 
we learnt so far?” see Annex) and a satirical one, which appeared in the famous magazine 
The Onion (“What we’ve learnt about Pluto”). The subject is the same, namely NASA’s 
New Horizons Pluto flyby, an extraordinary historic event, constituting humankind’s first 
close up view of the most remote planet in our solar system. Top scientists at Johns 
Hopkins and NASA have been working on it  for 15 years and the spacecraft was actually 
launched in 2006. “New Horizons overcame skeptical NASA officials, repeated threats to 
its funding, laboratory troubles that constricted the amount of plutonium available to 
power the spacecraft and an unforgiving deadline set by the clockwork of the planets. 
Though none of the obstacles packed the drama of space-exploration crises like the Apollo 
13 mission, their number and magnitude seemed unbelievable” reported the New York 
Times on July 18. Of course, scientists expected a great deal from the mission; in 
particular, they expected to gather crucial information about the history of our solar 
system. Unfortunately, despite the enthusiastic reports of scientific sites, the data that are 
slowly being streamed back to Earth from the spacecraft do not as of yet provide any 
specifically revolutionary information about the dwarf planet: hence the irony of the 
Onion. 
The BBC News article does not actually lack in irony itself: there are cues here and 
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there that the writer looks at the enterprise with some detachment (the informal register 
question: “What’s the weather like?” The phrasal irony of “dizzying 4kbs speed”), but 
these are easily recognizable as gentle or jocular irony made for the sake of the news 
layman reader. Still, it is important for us to keep them in mind, since they seem to suggest 
that the BBC journalist too is trying to approach the feelings of a reader confronted with 
scanty novelties. 
The text in The Onion succinctly summarises the ten putative discoveries made by 
the space probe, echoing pieces of the other report here and there. But the echoed 
expressions are not themselves just turned into their opposite: rather, they are modified, 
manipulated and distorted in several ways at both the micro- and the macrolevel thus 
contributing to the emergence of a global dissociative sceptical attitude towards the 
historic event. (The title itself is an echo: it semantically conveys the same information, 
but it is pragmatically twisted: apparently, we have certainties here, whereas the BBC title 
is a question in search of answers, but the reverse is true). 
 
“What we’ve learnt about Pluto” (The Onion, 14 July 2015) 
 
Nearly 10 years after its launch, the New Horizons space probe made a flyby 7,750 miles from 
Pluto, marking the first time in history a spacecraft has examined the dwarf planet up close, 
and NASA has begun to release data and images transmitted from the approach. Here’s what 
we’ve learned about Pluto so far: 
a. Has really let itself go since reclassification. 
b. Scant gravitational pull is only enough to hold one’s attention for about 40 seconds. 
c. Probably doesn’t have any trees. 
d. Will complete next orbit around the Sun well after certain obliteration of all life on Earth. 
e. Has five beautiful moons that it loves equally. 
f. May be capable of sustaining rock-based life. 
g. Is part of the United States. 
h. Will almost assuredly be plundered of all its natural resources within 20 years. 
i. We were way off painting it purple for our third-grade solar system diorama.  
j. Similarly cold, desolate, and uncaring as rest of universe. 
 
Let me concentrate on this text. The first point “Has really let itself go since 
reclassification” echoes the fact that scientists have discovered that the dwarf planet 
is a little “bigger than expected, about 80km wider than previous predictions”: the 
idiomatic, informal expression “let itself go” (typically referred in a sexist manner to 
women gaining weight) suggests an image of someone who does not care about her 
physical aspect, thus figuratively turning the cold planet into an uncaring individual. 
Irony does not rest on antiphrasis but on an echoed utterance related to physical 
fitness, which calls for a personification of the planet, and the incongruity between 
the register of the idiomatic expression and the register of scientific news. 
The second point hinges upon the polysemy of the implicit verb “attract”, at one 
time a scientific concept referred to gravitation, which is normally a strong force and is 
here downscaled to “scant gravitational pull”, and an ordinary verb that collocates with 
“attention” (to hold one’s attention). I would be tempted to say that nothing is echoed here 
apart from an implicit verb “attract” and that the ironic effect is based on the blend 
between the two meanings which, summed up with “for about 40 seconds”, gives rise to 
the further inference that the information we are gathering is scarcely important. 
The focus of irony in the third point is the adverb “probably”. It is patently obvious 
– and has long been known – that there can be no trees on Pluto (and this is presumably 
what is echoed). Therefore, the use of the adverb triggers the inference that one of the few 
certainties we had may turn into just a probability, and consequently that the new 
AUTHOR’S NAME AND SURNAME 90 
 
 
 
acquisitions are either totally irrelevant or uninformative. The clash which triggers the 
ironic interpretation, therefore, concerns epistemic modality. 
The fourth point ironically conveys a sceptical attitude about the relevance of any 
information we may get from the data, since by the time the planet will have completed its 
next orbit around the Sun, all life on Earth will have ceased – and consequently none of us 
will presumably be there to check their validity. The echo can be found in the already 
known information about “its 248 year orbit of the Sun”. 
The next point makes irony about the five moons. Again, we already knew that 
Pluto has five moons, but the irony comes from the fact that he (personification of Pluto) 
is said to love them all equally, as if they were his children or his wives. This cannot be 
true literally, of course, but the image is suggested of Pluto, the “dwarf planet”, as either a 
father or a kind of sultan surrounded by several wives. A sort of situational irony conveys 
the idea that, again, nothing new has been discovered in this connection and what has been 
discovered is meaningless or ridiculous. The expression “loving them all equally”, 
generally referred to one’s own children, may be identified as the primary source of the 
echo but again it is a clash of registers that triggers the ironic interpretation conveying a 
feeling of jocularity that minimizes the importance of the discovery. 
The next type of irony hinges again on modality: “maybe capable of sustaining 
rock-based life”. What is echoed is that Pluto is made of rock (and ice) but also that its 
temperatures “are extremely cold, ranging from -172 to -238 degrees C”. We know that 
these conditions do not normally support life. However, since nothing new has been 
discovered as to its rocky constituency, we might hypothesize that some form of life may 
be sustained by those rocks. Not so much the impossibility of the hypothesized life, as 
rather the possibility of even conceiving of it, seems to be the target of the irony. 
The three following statements (g-j) shift the attention from Pluto to the 
Americans: and here, again in terms of modality, the certainties replace the possibilities. 
That the new conquest undoubtedly belongs to the United States implicates a premise 
about American imperialism;  that it will plundered of all its natural resources hints at 
America’s lack of environmentalist conscience, and that “we were way off painting it 
purple” presupposes that, yes, we already knew that it was coloured, but we painted it 
wrongly when we were schoolchildren. Reference to children brings about a deflationary 
effect as if he were saying “but the issue of the colour is for schoolchildren”. Here, a 
criticism is levelled towards the attitudes of the Americans via statements which are far 
from being antiphrastic. Quite to the contrary, they all insinuate truths that, if compared 
with the jocular, sometimes affective, tone of the previous ones, sound more sarcastic and 
bitter, and together contribute to a climax that, having started with scepticism, ends up 
with the final cynical remark, turning the whole text into a sharper satire than expected.  
Indeed, the last simile (“Similarly cold, desolate and uncaring as rest of universe”) 
carrying the semantic presupposition that all the universe is cold, desolate and uncaring 
(presumably, of the great conquests of mankind), emphasizes our perception of the 
meaninglessness of human enterprises and specifically of whatever information we may 
now get from Pluto. 
Now, we cannot say that the Onion literally “echoes” the BBC because, if we look 
at the dates, the former appeared before the latter. However, we can broaden the 
Relevance theoretic notion of “echo” to mean “allusion” to something which was in the air 
and which is referred to in both texts. This possibility is actually acknowledged by Sperber 
and Wilson (1981): 
 
Some are immediate echoes, and others delayed; some have their source in actual utterances, 
others in thoughts and opinions; some have a real source, others an imagined one; some are 
91 
 
 
 
Title. Subtitle 
traceable back to a particular individual, whereas others have a vaguer origin. (Sperber and 
Wilson 1981, p. 310) 
 
In other words, both texts can be said to “echo” a third party source, but while the 
BBC text only drops some ironic remarks suggesting some scepticism in a couple of 
expressions, the Onion ironically dissociates from the attitudes presupposed by 
allegedly true scientific reports in several ways. I have also remarked that we 
perceive a contrast between the first part (a-f) and the second part (g-j) which calls 
for finer distinctions, since there irony turns into sarcasm and cynicism and they all 
contribute to the making of satire. 
It seems to me that the kinds of attitudes associated with the ironic remarks 
not only constitute a climax in terms of affects – from jocular to harsh – but also 
increase in terms of complexity and differ in terms of quality. Statements (a-f) each 
express an attitude on  a proposition p, where p has an echo in shared knowledge 
about Pluto; statements (g-j) express attitudes on attitudes: towards the Americans 
and towards their attitudes on the Pluto enterprise. The last one is  of a different 
nature, evoking an overall sceptical attitude towards both Pluto and the Americans, 
possibly towards humankind, and their meaninglessness in the universe. The 
resulting satire is a function of all these attitudes. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
As the examples reported and  discussed demonstrate, irony calls for a subtle analysis of 
its contextual interpretations. I have suggested that this happens in terms of a process of 
inferential search which aims to discover not only what the speaker is communicating but 
also why  the speaker is communicating it ironically. The suggested answer is that through 
irony we can communicate much more than could be expressed by the putative non ironic 
counterpart, namely a whole series of propositional and non-propositional attitudes which 
combine to produce  effects that  can only be grasped in context. Thus, while  I agree with 
the Relevance Theory claim that attitudes are crucial in irony interpretation, I have also 
argued, siding with Yus (2016) and Bromberek Dyzman (2012), that  the interpretation 
process brings to the fore the role of both propositional and non-propositional attitudes. 
Yus (2016,p. 95) claims that “the object of the affective attitude is the source of the echo 
towards which a dissociative attitude is held”. In my opinion, most of the above examples 
show that irony communicates also affective attitudes which may have as their objects 
other components of the communicative situation, and that sometimes the purpose of irony 
may be the wish not to take direct responsibility for the negative ones but other times it 
may be inviting inferential ascription as to the positive ones. These effects can be achieved 
by the ironist either by manipulating the propositional content or the attitudes 
conventionally attached to it (or both) in such a way as to create further incongruities or 
contrasts with expectations in the context of utterance (Averbeck 2010, Averbeck and 
Hample 2008). This calls, in my opinion, for a richer notion of “attitude” as an internally 
articulated category along the lines proposed above; in Relevance theoretic terms this is to 
be included in the enriched representation of what is said as a slot to be inferentially filled 
in the context. My point is that irony, as a complex attitude, magnifies the communicative 
potential of the utterance, enriching communication with layers of implicit meanings 
which are not traceable  to the linear sum of its single components. Comprehension 
succeeds when the set of attitudes in the mind of the ironist is grasped by the addressee; 
misunderstandings happen when the complex of attitudes evoked by the ironist is either 
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partially grasped or not grasped at all. Successful ironies therefore call for addressees who 
are able to manage multiple dimensions of sense making: flattery is part of the ironic game 
as much as empathy, sharing and intimacy. 
In this sense, the analyses provided above are my answer to Hutcheon’s question “Why 
should anyone want to use this strange mode of discourse where you say something you 
don’t actually mean, and expect people to understand not only what you actually do mean 
but also your attitude toward it?” (Hutcheon 1995, p. 2).  
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Annex 
PLUTO: What have we learnt so far? (from BBC NEWS, 15 July 2015) 
Now that the New Horizons probe has successfully flown past Pluto and confirmed to 
Nasa that it is all in one piece, researchers can look forward to a "waterfall" of 
images and data from the strange, distant world over the next 16 months. But even 
though just a couple of pictures from the dwarf planet have been released so far, 
scientists are learning more from these than they have in years of attempted 
observations by telescope.  
What is Pluto's heart made from?  
For 60 years scientists have known that there was a bright mass on Pluto, but it was only 
through the increased resolution provided by the cameras on board New Horizons 
that detailed its distinctive heart shape.  The shape, instantly beloved on social 
media, is believed to have been caused by an impact at some point in history. One 
side of the heart is smoother than the other. Researchers believe the crater is filled 
with frozen gases from the atmosphere - namely nitrogen, methane and carbon 
dioxide. However a false coloured photo from Pluto released by Nasa indicates that 
the heart is actually broken in two. The colours show different chemical signatures 
in the image. On the left it is a type of beige while on the right is a mosaic of blue, 
these indicate that the two parts had different geologic or tectonic origins. 
 
Is Pluto another red planet? 
The initial image released by Nasa had a reddish hue, something that scientists have long 
known. It's very different from the other red planet, Mars, in that the colour of the 
more distant, tiny world is likely caused by hydrocarbon molecules called tholins, 
that are formed when solar ultraviolet light and cosmic rays interact with methane 
in Pluto's atmosphere and on its surface. "Pluto's reddening process occurs even on 
the night side where there's no sunlight, and in the depths of winter when the sun 
remains below the horizon for decades at a time," according to New Horizons co-
investigator Michael Summers. 
Does Pluto's size matter? 
New Horizons has provided more accurate information on the size and scope of Pluto. It's 
a little bigger than expected, about 80km wider than previous predictions, making 
it around two thirds the size of our moon. The increased dimensions mean that 
Pluto is likely to be made of less rock and more ice beneath its surface according to 
members of the mission team. The reclassification means that Pluto is now 
officially bigger than Eris, one of hundreds of thousands of mini-planets and comet-
like objects circling beyond Neptune in a region called the Kuiper Belt.  
Is Pluto geologically active? 
The relative lack of impact craters on Pluto suggested by the first image could be an 
indication that the surface of the dwarf planet is renewing, either by geological or 
atmospheric activity, such as erosion. Mission chief Alan Stern says there is 
evidence of "surface activity" on Pluto, a tantalising hint of earth-like tectonics "in 
its past or even its present". Nasa have dubbed one of the strange, darker regions 
of Pluto the "whale".  Researchers say it is unusual to have contrasting bright and 
dark surfaces on objects in our Solar System, reflecting the fact that Pluto is far 
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more complex than previously thought.  
What's the weather like? 
Surface temperatures on Pluto are extremely cold, ranging from -172 to -238 degrees C 
depending on where it is on its 248 year orbit of the Sun. Since it passed the closest 
point to our star back in 1989, experts assumed that after that the dwarf planet 
started cooling. Some computer models even predicted that the atmosphere would 
have fallen as snow and disappeared. That hasn't happened. But the New Horizons 
Principal Investigator agrees that snow does likely fall on the distant body. "Pluto 
has strong atmospheric cycles, it snows on the surface, the snows sublimate and go 
back into the atmosphere each 248 year orbit," said Alan Stern. 
What about the five moons? 
Little light has so far been shed on the moons of Pluto but the coloured image released 
yesterday indicates that Charon, the biggest, is covered with red material around 
its pole.  Scientists believe that this stuff may be tholins that have escaped from 
Pluto's atmosphere.  Experts believe that the mottled colours at lower latitudes 
point to a diversity of terrains on Charon.  So far little detail has emerged about the 
other moons of Pluto except more accurate measurements of their size.  
How are the images and data being transmitted to Earth? 
Very slowly indeed. At a distance of 5bn kilometres from Earth and with a radio 
transmitter that can only output 12 watts, that means New Horizons is signalling 
across the Solar System with the equivalent power of a small LED bulb.  The 
transfer rate is achingly slow, around 1kb per second - if things go really well it can 
reach a dizzying 4kb. That's slow even by 1980s standards.  All this means that a 
black and white picture of Pluto would take over three hours to transmit. Even if 
massively compressed it would still take around 20 minutes.  As Nasa is handling 
communications to several other missions at one time, it means that New Horizons 
has to wait in the queue for access to the Deep Space Network, the radio 
telescopes that communicate with distant probes.  Getting all the data from the 
brief flypast of Pluto will take almost 16 months. 
